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Arne Johan Vetlesen (2015) The denial of nature: environmental 
philosophy in the era of global capitalism (London: Routledge) xi + 223 
pp. ISBN 9780415724746 cloth, 9781315848273 paper. 
This book argues for a paradigm shift in environmental philosophy. Arne Johan 
Vetlesen, who is a Norwegian ethicist, asserts that environmental philosophy is 
implicated in the pathologies it otherwise seeks to challenge. In order to 
become part of the proverbial solution, rather than the problem, Vetlesen 
argues for an experience-based philosophy predicated on concrete 
engagements with the biophysical world.  
The denial of nature is comprised of four long, dense yet readable chapters 
sandwiched between an introduction and a conclusion. Vetlesen’s starting 
point is the fact that environmental philosophy has grown in size and 
prominence during a period when the natural world has lost ever more of its 
naturalness due to human activities. One might surmise that this simply reflects 
the limited role that philosophy today plays in shaping public values. But 
Vetlesen identifies a more fundamental problem: according to him, 
environmental philosophy has been pursued in the same intellectual and 
abstract manner as most other areas of Western philosophy. This serves to 
hold ‘real nature’ at a distance and presumes that reasoning about nature’s 
value can, in the end, change hearts and minds. For Vetlesen it thereby 
reproduces the society-nature dualism entrenched in the wider culture, while 
ignoring the massive psychological investment modern people have in a 
capitalist way of life that systematically separates most of us from sustained 
contact with a biophysical world we are, nonetheless, utterly dependent on. 
What is needed, he argues, is a truly radical approach to environmental 
philosophy that redefines the intellectual and affective basis on which 
philosophising occurs. 
In chapter 1 Vetlesen describes the character of society-nature relations with 
reference to Theresa Brennan’s books Exhausting modernity (2000) and 
Globalization and its Terrors (2003). Brennan’s neo-Marxist approach blends 
political economy with psychoanalytical theory. Vetlesen commends her 
attempt to show that the separations and abstractions that capitalism creates 
have a crucial psychic element: they penetrate into people’s sense of self, not 
least by institutionalising the notion of ‘individuals’ separate from ‘society’ and 
‘environment’. Technology is a key part of this since it mediates people’s 
physical relations with soils, minerals, animals and much more besides.  
In chapter two – entitled ‘Nature deficit in critical theory’ – Vetlesen takes the 
Frankfurt School to task for its persistent anthropocentrism and limited 
attempt to explore the ecologically destructive character of modern capitalist 
societies. The School’s nature denial is taken as symptomatic of critical social 
theory more widely. Chapter three then considers how environmental 
philosophy has sought to acknowledge and challenge this anti-ecocentrism.  
Vetlesen focuses on the well- known ethicists Paul Taylor, J. Baird Callicott, 
and Holmes Rolston III. But he also offers an appreciative discussion of Hans 
Jonas’s philosophy of being (Jonas is not usually discussed by Anglophone 
environmental philosophers). According the Vetlesen, Jonas’s ideas provide a 
vital bridge between the ecocentric philosophy of Taylor, Callicott and Rolston 
and the experience-based ecocentric ethics that we desperately need to 
institutionalise and normalise worldwide. This is because Jonas pushes us to 
consider the world not in intellectual terms but in practical terms, as 
organisms existing in nature who are themselves of nature.   
A major everyday barrier to such practical engagement is technology. In a 
capitalist world technologies are ubiquitous and ever changing. They 
paradoxically connect us with nature even as they distance us from it. Vetlesen 
turns to another post-war German philosopher – Gunther Anders – to help 
readers appreciate the psychic implications of these technologies. As the 
decades pass, capitalist technology institutes an ever-more insidious 
devaluation of nature, causing irreversible biophysical loss and change. Towards 
the end of the chapter, taking indigenous cosmologies and the example of 
animals, Vetlesen points towards an experiential environmental ethic that 
involves people in a new sense of world and of self. In the conclusion, partly 
inspired by the writings of Freya Matthews, Vetlesen advocates ‘panpsychism’. 
This acknowledges the psychic dimension of all physical things and processes. 
For Vetlesen it is only achievable by immersion in life’s buzzing, blooming 
confusion and present-day neoliberal capitalism is inimical to that. This means 
that conventional philosophical reasoning is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
help change the world. On the contrary, only a revolution in our way of life 
will allow panpsychism to strike us as more than a fanciful philosophical 
proposition.  
 
As a non-philosopher I found the book to be stimulating. It surveys a lot of 
intellectual territory with clarity and presents an interesting plenary argument. 
Though some might find his case too derivative of others’ writings, Vetlesen’s 
book made me ponder whether the majority of Western social science and 
humanistic scholarship exists in an ‘iron cage’ it is powerless to escape. Though 
we academics believe ‘academic freedom’ is something real and valuable, 
Vetlesen implies that un-freedom reigns insofar as environmental philosophy 
internalises its wider socio-environmental context ‘all the way down’. It is 
interesting to consider, in the context of this journal, just how ‘independent’ 
critical realist thinking is in its various permutations.  
This said, there are a number of obvious problems that arise with Vetlesen’s 
call for a paradigm shift in environmental philosophy. First, on what basis does 
his argument for a less academic and abstract philosophy arise? Is he himself 
‘experienced’ in his positive sense of that term? I ask because the book’s style 
is typically philosophical: long chapters pay homage to key thinkers and 
variously praise or criticise their thinking en route to Vetlesen’s preferred 
version of an ecocentric ethic. This leaves one wondering if the author is using 
the resources of the ‘old’ paradigm to argue for a new one; there’s certainly 
nothing alternative about the mode of argumentation. Secondly, the author 
aside, what potentialities exist in the contemporary world to suggest that 
Vetlesen’s thesis is anything more than a case of wishful thinking? The book 
stays clear of discussing what immanent forces might foster a widespread 
protest against present-day ‘ecocide’. The book’s own argument suggests that 
an anthropocentric ethics is now so widespread globally that experience-based 
alternatives to it are increasingly sparse and lack the power and visibility to 
mount a challenge. Indeed, the book’s final page laments the ‘vicious cycle’ we 
are collectively stuck in. The result is that The denial of nature is unable to do 
more than enjoin its readers to change, as if the power of argument could 
counteract the lack of historical conditions conducive to its realisation.  
Vetlesen knows that injunctions are not nearly enough, and so his book takes 
on some of the melancholy we associated with Adorno’s post-war conclusion 
that that solutions may not exist for systemic problems. 
In sum, this is an engaging book that is a pleasure to read. But I am not sure it 
takes environmental ethics in quite the new directions Vetlesen wants to 
travel. 
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